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I. Ovrerview of the Model
The model to be presented in this paper treats both the location
decisions of econcmic agents and the tax and ej^jenditure decisions of
local govemnents as itutually influencing endogenous processes. Thus,
in an iitipartant sense we shall be dealing with a closed system. This
characteristic is a significant inclination tCT>/ard realisn. Other
aspects of the model, vmfcrtunately, will lean otherwise because of the
need to achieve notable sinplification to maJce the model tractable at
this stage, since the relationships vMch are included produce a difficult
ccnplex. Ihe modal is advanced as cne of a set of studies which attenpts
to come to grips with progressively more intricate representations of
the political-econcmic interplay within an Arterican-type metropolitan
area — a metropolitan area with fragmented local governmental juris-
dictions as corrponents of a federal systan. Ihese studies consist of
both theoretical and econoraetric nonipulations in order to gain
appreciation of the issues and magnitudes involved. The present
paper contains only a theoretical examinaticn, and the riKxiel is
presented in an informal, largely graphical fashion to facilitate an
intuitive grasp of the materials,
Wfe begin by assuming that there are two local goveimmental juris-
dictions — a central city and a suburb. Vfe next assume that the popu-
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lation of the area is fixed for the period under study. This
popiilation is honogeneous with respect to the demograjfivLc factors
vdiich are usually held to influence household location choice bet>^en
-2-
3
city and suburb, but is assuited to differ in incone level. Ihe incxsne
distribution approximates vAiat actually prevails in such areas.
The population is faced witli the choice of v^ether to reside in
the central city or the suburb. Business firms — both industrial and
ccctrnercial — are also deaiied to have to neke this decision, but the
present raodel sinplifies their choice substantially to highlight the
residential location decision. Business choices are treated as
essentially exogenous. Subsequent models attempt to treat both
residential and business location as erriogenous.
Suburban location differs frcm central city location in three
respects: (1) it has less dense land use, (2) it is generally less
accessible, (3) it is governed locally by a separate jurisdiction than
that of the centred city. The first two differences are related: they
both stem from our assuirption that business, culturail and recreatiaial
destinations are disproportionately concentrated in the central city
within the relevant range of spatial distributicns dealt with in this paper.
There are accordingly four general concerns wMch influence
residential location decisions: (1) the basic subsjdtutability of
city and suburban land (such that price differences greater or less
than the value of the use differences between than will exert systematic
tendencies for shifting from one to the other) ; (2) preferences for
greater or lesser density land use; (3) the configuratiai of relative
accessibilities defined in terms of particular ertployitent, shopping,
recreation, etc. destinations; and (4) advantages and disadvantages of
being governed by the city versus the suburban jurisdiction. The raodel
organizes these concems so as to illuminate and v^igh the positive
and negative forces for choosing oneover the other. Suburban location will
k
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will be favored by strong preferences for low land density (v*iich we
call "privacy") ; by a particular minority conbination of enployitent
circumstance and ccratcditY preferences which make suburban destinations
more relevant than central city destinations (so that it is central
city location that is the less accessible) ; by financial and conmodity
preference advantages inhering in being governed by suburban rather
than central city government; and by relative prices between the tvro
locations such that net central city advantages are oveirpriced of
suburban advantages underpriced.
An earlier model of the same 15^ being presented here developed
4in detail a number of specific advantages for suburban location. Ihey
fall under tw3 general heads, land use density and jurisdicitcnal
separateness,
1. Land use density: the advantage and cost of "privac^^'^"
.
Low
land use density affords a kind of "privacy" of living space — both
within the hate and in public. It is a corrmodity, subject to purchase,
and at a price. We considered it a luxury good, witii incane elasticity
5greater than 1. Its price is the accessibility generally sacrificed
to attain it. Ihis price can be expressed as tliat part of the cost
of lesser accessibility v^ich is not offset by a land price differential
between suburb and city. Its magnitude thus depends on travel costs
(including the value of time) , and larid price differences. The overall
advantage relates the value of the degree of privacy available to
potential recipients — v^iich degree is itself a variable, depending cxi
the difference in land use density between city and suburb — to its
price. Both valuations are specific to the circumstances of the households
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involved. In general, higher incx^me households will find net advantages
greater than will lowsr incOTne households.
This tendency is augmented by a suburban govemrttental device — minimum
lot zoning. Such zoning legally prevents the erosion of low density use
by setting effective ceilings on total residential use. It operates by
irt^josing additional housing costs on households that wouM, in the absence
of the zoning constraint, have bought a smaller land ccsrponent than
officially required in their housing service conplex. Ihis cost affects
lowsr and moderate inocme families, but not richer ones.
2. Jurisdictional separateness ; advantages of fragmented "lybme rule."
There are advantages to be obtained by placing oneself — thuough establishing
residence — under the jurisdiction of a suburban government rather than
a central city govemraent, Ihree important types concern (a) inter-
jurisdictional spillover effects, (b) the differences in jurisdictional
inocme and the cost of public services, and (c) the burden of wslfare
payments.
a. Interjurisdictional spillover effects. Because of the elaborate
set of interrelaticnships in a metropolitan area, citN^ residents have
a presence in the suburb and suburbanites have a presence in the city.
Ihey make use of one another's private and public services. Because of
the basic asymmetry between city and suburb regarding concentration of
business, government, and recreation, however, there is greater suburban
presence in t±ie city than the reverse. l"Jhile cross-use of private
goods is coipletely reconpensed by private extjhange transactions, such
cDoss-use of public goods is inadequately paid for because of the lack
of subtle enough means of calculating liabilities, the unavailability
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of adequately pinpointed tax inechanisins, and tlie inability generally to
exclude outsiders frcsti the benefits. In providing for quality-quantity
levels of public output desired by their own residents, goveminents find
themselves having to incur costs in ejo^ess of T^Aiat would be necessary
if outsiders werte not able to have a "presence" across jurisdictional
lines. The asyimietry of such presence between city aixi suburb msans
that the total tax liability on city residents is inflated by a charge
for that part of suburbanite-generated public service costs v*iich could
not be collected from suburbanites, SEhe city resident's tax rate will
exceed that of the suburbanite even vdiere both city and suburb offer
the sane level of public services to their residents. These interjuris-
dictional spillovers or external diseconanies give a financial advantage
to locating in the suburb. Here too, the aniount of the advantage is a
rising function of household income level. Of course, no such discrepancy
would appear if suburbanites, despite this very sane "presence" in
the central city, were constituents of a single metropolitan-wide
jurisdiction, for then internal taxation could raise the appropriate
cattpensation and inpose the appropriate incentives on econanic agents.
It is jurisdictional separateness that permits the problem and thus
the artificial advantages to suburban locaticn to arise.
b. Income level and price differences. In any jurisdiction with
a tax vMch is a positive function of household incone, households having
incoraes hi^ier than the mean will pay more than those at and below the
mean. Moreover, if a group of those above the mean seceded to form a
new inocme-hcitiogeneous j\xrisdicticn with populations equal in the two
jurisdictions, the saite total public expense in the twD would elicit a
I
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lov^r tax rate in the richer ccratunity than in the poorer. Thus, any
household voald, in inoving frcm tiie poorer to the richer contnunity,
es^jerience a virtual decrease in the cost of public services; but,
once again, this decrease is greater in absolute aitount the hi(^er is
the household's inconne level, TJiis tax rate differential is an advantage
like being faced with a decrease in the price of a private good ccnsmtEd
by the household. Ihe value of the benefit is measured by the consumer
surplus gain resulting, and this depends partly on the response to
lower price forthcatdng in the amount of the good ccnsumsd.
Public good oonsurrpticn does not respond to the clioices of any
one housdiold, but it does respond to the choices of the vi^ole resident
populaticai. This is the respect in vMch public shoice is endogenous
in the system. Wte assume that public choice can be predicted as the
majority vote of the electorate. In maJdng the predictions, we mist
know the preferences of each meirber of the electorate, and how these
change, so that a pattern of majority vote can be inferred from each set
of cireumstarjces.
A short-cut predictive device can be used in certain circumstances —
namely, vtere preferences of the vAiole electorate can be represented in
terms of distances along a single dimension ("single-peakedness") . In
the present model, v^ere pxjblic services cure homogeneous ("quality"
differences are really differences in a quantity level per capita) , this
is nbt a bad apparoxunatLon, Under these circumstances we can predict
rtajority vote as the value of the iredian preference positicn. In the
further specialization of the present model, involving a nearly syrmetrical
incotiE distribution, similar tastes, a proporticnal inccne tax, and relatively
constant price and incoie elasticities for public goods in the neighborhood
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of mean incxsrae, the rredian incane household has the median preference
position. So public good deirand in the richer catmunity exceeds that
of the poorer. A given household, in moving from poorer to richer
comtunity, ejqseriences both a lower price and a larger public demand.
This reflects the higher cannunity income level, and the lower price
viiich the higher income of the ccrnnunity makes possible. The households,
in moving, shares the benefits of the catmunity 's higher income through
the collective redistribution resulting from a single tax rate in the
jurisdiction. So the hi^er level of Di±)lic good provision, along with
the lower price, enter as tte measurement of benefit. Ifaey are the
fruit of a richer--t±ian-average portion of the oeerall S^4SA population
being able to segregate itself as a separate jurisdicticn so as to
begin and remain relatively uncontaminated by the presence of lower
income households vtose circumstances vrouM produce a less satisfactory
and more expensive public good output for the wealthy.
Here too it is the richer households that obtain the benefit,
and the richer the household the greater the benefit, but at the
expense of the poorer households.
c. The burden of welfare payments. Vfe can distinguish between
the level (quality or quantity) of provision of government services and
their distribution among the population. The provision of certain
"welfare-type services" is treated in the present model not as a
separate type of public good but as a characteristic of the distrifcution
of homogeneous public goods. ''Welfare clients" are those v4io consume
considerably more than the average amount of public goods. Vfe assume,
for exanple, that a fixed supplemental "welfare package" of public
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services goes to welfare clients over and above the normal (variable)
conpleinent of public services provided generally, and that the nonns
within the metropolitan area are horrogeneous enou^ so that this
supplenient is the saine both in the central city and the suburb.
Hien if a given amount, or constant per capita expenditure, of resources
is to be used to furnish public services in a jurisdiction, the greater
is the proportion of welfare clients in the jurisdiction's population,
the lower is the general level of provision that can be raade with
these resources. In effect, therefore the welfare client load
affects the real price of furnishing any general level of public goods.
This influences the well-being of all members of the population in
the same direction — including tlie welfare clients themselves, since
each such client consumes higher absolute levels of public goods
(narmal plus welfare package) the fewer other welfare clients there
are in a given total jurisdictional population.
Thus, two ccmrtunities with different percentages of "welfare
households" will face different real prices for ^jublic goods — i.e.,
a different average tax rate per unit of average consurtption of public
goods. As in the second category, higher incate households will thus
experience higher total benefits than lower income households. Insofar
as suburbs have substantially lower percentages of their populatiois
in the welfare case load than central cities, the price of public
goods will tervd to be less there than in the latter on this account,
thereby augmenting similar differences for the other two types of
advantage. Ihis constitutes an additional inducement to move from
central city to suburb, an inducement that is stronger for hi(^er
than for lower inccme households.
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Ihe key to both the last two types of advantage rests in suburban
7
residence being attractive to above average incoma groups and
unattractive to significantly belcv? average groups. The separate
jurisdictionality of the suburb makes this possible, especially
through the public policy of minimum lot zoning. Ihis exacerbates
the regressivity of suburban attractions: not only are these
attractions less strong for the poor than the rich, they are actually
negative. Ihe poor are repelled by a prospect of net loss from
suburbcin location. So income selectivity is maintained and, with it,
the original sources of attraction.
Ihe fundamental thesis of the model is that every household that
can gain by moving fron central city to sijburb will do so. An eqailibriura
exists when everyone vAio can gain frcm such a nove has done so, and the
marginal household refraining from the move just fails to be able
to profit frcm the move. Ihe reason v^y any household should fail
to gain is that the size of all of the types of advantage noted is a rising
function of incatie and falling function of number of movers. Since
richest gain most, they move first. Subsequent moves are by less rich.
Thus, the larger the number of movers the lovrer the incone level of the
marginal mover. In addition, as noted above, the gains fron land
density are actually negative for lower income families. First,
privacy is nuch diminished as the suburban population rises and in any
case is not a highly valued cattnodity for such families, rtareover,
travel costs to overccme inaccessibility are significant for sush
families and suburban land costs rise with larger popiiLation. Finally,
minimum lot zoning requirements represent a greater and greater cost the
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IcMsr is family incane, since the discrepancy betvreen desired and
minimum required lot size widens as incortB declines. Ihus, net
advantages are negative far some families, positive for others, and at
the margin, zero, Ihe marginal mover experiences zero or slightly
positive gains, the marginal non-mover zero or slightly negative gains.
The boundary between movers and non-movers is not fixed. It is
influenced by a number of environmental cliaracteristics, sane of viiich
are subject to policy manipulation by the respective jurisdiction
goverrments. "The central city government can influence location decisions
by varying the amount of taxes collected frcm suburbanites to offset
externality-generated resource costs, Ihey can also vary the
percentage of resident-derived revenues v^ich they levy en land as
opposed to iraprovQients. Since the simply of land is inelastic v^iile
that of irt^HTovenents is not, taxes levied on the former hava little
gdiscouraging effect on location, ^i^iile the latter, since they can be
avoided by locating outside the jurisdiction, teM to discourage city
location.
Ihe suburban government possesses the same choice betveen land
and improvement tax. In addition, it erploys tsro zoning instruments
\diich have further influence on location. One stipulates minimum lot
sizes for residential use, the other stipulates the maximum amount of
business acreage that may be permitted. Since in the present model
we assume the size of the suburb to be fixed, the first of these
in effect sets an upper limit to the suburban resicfent pcpxilation,
Ihe second directly sets a similar ceiling on business activity.
The present model concentrates on residential locatiai. But business
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location is not omitted. Ihe distribation of businesses is assumed
to be an irnportant influence on residential location decisicns. It is
handled here largely as an esoogenous variable. Businesses are assumed
to have been excluded by the suburbs through zoning against their will.
Ehey locate there to the full extent permitted by the zoning ceiling.
If the zoning ceiling is lowered or raised, business changes to the
exact level of the new ceiling. Thus, suburban govemnent can directly
influence the distribution of business v/ithin the iretropolitan area by
manipulating its business zoning. Vfe assume that v^ile they may itake
variations in it, hov^sver, they do not extend the ceiling so far as
to wipe out the essential disparity of business ccncentraticn betoi^een
city and suburb — and therefore the essential cliaracter of the two.
The two governments are assumed to act as agents of their
constitutots in orploying these policy instruments. As an approximation,
their interests are assumed to be advanced by attempting to maximize
the prodTictivit/ of their jurisdiction as a site for economic aictivity,
Ihis inplies that each government acts to maximize the total value of
land in its own jiirisdicticn.
The maximization process therefore ^^)Drks as follows. Say that a
set of values has been set by the twD jurisdictions for its polic^^
variables, all but one at its optimal level. With tiiis initial set,
a given configuration of potential gains fron sutwrbanization emerges.
Prospective gainers raovQ> thereby determining an equilibriun value of
suburban pcptilation size. This determines a split in the populatiai
array in terms of household income level: marginal migration inccme
9
IS determined. Ihe partition of the income array determines the rrean
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and median incotE levels in each jurisdicticn. The size and nature of
the gains fron jurisdictional separatenass, together with the inccne
level differences, determine the virtual price levels of public goods
facing constitutoits in each jurisdiction ( a different real price for
each liDusehold income level). Ihese price levels, together with the
array of household incomss, determine the majority vote level of public
output to be pxivided. Ihus, public finance and other policy instruments,
through their effects upon location decisions, induce indirect reverber-
ations upon public expenditure decisions. Ihe p\jblic sector is both
an initiator and recipient of decision-italcing impulses.
Now, suboptimality is recognized in the policy decision of one
jurisdicticn: a change in the one misaligned policy instrument vrould
raise total land value. So the government changes the value of the
sole misaligned instrument. This clianges the pattern of prospective gains
fron si±urbEin over city loca<tiion, so households now dislodged fron
equilibrium irake their equilibrating location adjustment. Ihe result
is a new optimal suburban size and hence a new partiticaiing of the
irdone array. This leads to a different set of public output prices
ccnfrOTiting constituents of eadi jurisdiction. Finally, a new
set of equilibrium relative public output levels results.
Ihis is a brief overview of the character of the model. Hereafter
we shall be concerned to spell out more precisely the nature of the
various adjustments carried out, the properties of the equilibrating
process and of the equilibrium configuration, and the consequences of
a system with relationships such as the cnes postulated here. Our
central focus throughout is the iitpact which the character of local
govemmant has on the jurisdicticnal (and hence spatial) distribution of
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of econanic activities, and the reciprocal impact which this latter in
.turn has on the fonner.
A more precise specification of the model follows.
II. Specification of the Model
First, we assume that the production of public services is
perfectly respoasive to the coimunity demand. "Hiis demand is ejqsressed
as the outccme of an ejdiaustive series of paired cortparisCTi votes,
each decided by majority rule. The alternatives of choice are different
quality ( = quantity per capita) levels of public service output (where
outputs are expressed in hoitiogeneous service units, and are distinct
fran inputs used in the public sector) . Dfe assume that individual
preferences over these altema-tives are tmi-diraensicaial ("single-peaked")
.
So the outcone of majority rule voting will be the median most preferred
alternative within the population. With certain regularity assuirpticns
on preferences and income distribution we approximate this as the
preference peak for the median inccme level recipient (since preferences
vary in this model only according to inccaftie differences) . Thus, the
jurisdictional demand for, and hence supply of, public services is
given in (1)
:
(1 a-b) G^ = G [y^(N^), r ] i = 1, 2
where G. is the level of per capita public services in jurisdiction i
t i - 1, 2 central city, suburb respectively )
y. (N.) is the median income in i vAien the population of i is N.
T. is the per unit (output) price of public services to
the in§dian taxpayer in i,
and vAiere the public service price is equal to the tax tate times the
relevant income tax base; so:
(1 c-d) T^ = y^(N^) P^, i = 1, 2
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vAiere PV is the location-relevant jurisdictional tax rate per
unit of public output, to be defined belov;.
For econcmetric estimation purposes, the incore distribution in
the overall metropolitan population would have to be estimated. Then,
in the li^t of the relationships in the model it \«ould be possible
to predict the ordered array of potential siaburban migrants, therday
determining for each hypothetical size of the suburb (N_) and central
city (N, ) the income level identity, and so the incote distribution,
in each jurisdiction.
Strictly speaking, these distributions are endogenous to the model.
For purposes of coaniputer Simulaticn, however, a short-cut approximation
can be suggested. On the basis of data cari actual metropolitan area (Sr-ISA)
income distributions and the monotonicity of advantages for suburban
location with respect to household income level, 've can ej^ress reduced
form approximations of the jurisdictional inocme distributions directly.
In doing so, it will be convenient to make use of a procediiral sinplification
designed to throw the critical issues into relief — namely, that the
ayiSA population is constant over fulctuations in inter-jurisdictions
migration. Ihus, N = SCISA populaticn = coistant. Since N, + N^ = N,
this constancy means that v^ may deal in population proportions
N N
unambiguously. Each N^ uniquely inplies an
_1 ( = rii) ^nd an _2( = n^)
,
N N
(with n, + n- = 1)
.
We then approximate the jurisdictional medians as follows:
(2a) 5]. = Y3_ + Y2nj^ with Y^^ + Y2 = Y
(2b) Y = y'+ Y3n with A > 1 and "y + Y3 = Y
where y is median income in the vAiole SMSA population.
y is the highest income recieved in the SVISA populaticn.
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Vfe now turn to the cost function for public services — the
relatiaiship between the cost of the productive inputs and the output
of ptiblic services. The distincticn beti«een the two is central to
the present approach, and differs from traditional treatment which
measures public good output by the value of inputs used to produce them.
Four aspects must be ccnsidered. First is the sheer resource cost
of providing certain public ccmmodities in different types of canraunities
characterized by size, population, composition, and certain relevant,
non-social envirorffnental factors. Inportant isstaes aire involved here,
but these are somewhat more conventional than the aspects vMch the
present vrork is emphasizing. To help throw these latter into relief,
we make sane extremely sirtplifying assumptions concerning the former.
To begin, v^ile public goods may be heterogeneous, we allow
variations only in the size of packages of these goods held in fixed
composition: i.e., changing levels are measured in terms of honogeneous
package sizes. Moreover, \ve assume that althou^ our public goods
do generate inportant externalities, they are not "pure" public goods,
in the Samuelscn sense. In order to provide a constant quality of public
services as population increases, additional resources must be used
to offset crowding phencarEna, to meet higher distribution costs, etc.
Our sirtplification l^re is to assume that the per capita cost of each
unit of service output is constant: i.d,, zero scale economies or
disecononies, both with respect to population size and quality level of
public goods provision. Ihis scale neutrali-ty enables attention to
be fixed on the other issues vMch this model stresses. It can, however,
be relaxed without contradicting — but masking saneviiat — the basic
relationships. Finally, we assume that the constant per capita cost of
k
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public services is unaffected by type of cormunity.
Ihe three other aspects ooncem the sources of attractiveness
of suburban location. These sources are reflected in the price of
public services and, as such, affect public output and location
decisions. The first of these is interjurisdictional externalities.
Ihis in turn has two facets: (1) the differential preserK^e of
suburbanites in the central city (over city dwellers' presence in
the suburbs) raises the resource cost of each level of per capita
public services in the city relative to that in the suburb; (2)
taxation of suburbanites' presence to recoup save of the externality
effects itself incurs administrative and allocational costs.
The second source of suburban attractiveness is jxorisdictional
incoite level differences. This has the effect of creating jurisdictional
differences in the tax rate necessciry to finance any given total resource
cost. It can be reflected by expressing each total resource cost as
a cost per dollar of tax base.
The third source is the inpact of the welfare case load. As
indicated earlier, we assmie that each welfare client in the 3>ISA.
receives the sane welfare supplanent in public goods over and aibove
the nontal per capita consuinpticn level. As a result, a given total
of resources will furnish a lower normal per capita public service
level to everyone the higher is the v^lfare case load as a proportion
of the total population. Consequently, production of each desired
normal per capita level in any jurisdiciton will cost more the
larger is the proportion of the popilation of that jurisdiction
v^iich is on welfare. Interjurisdictional cost differences en this
account will therefore depend on relative proporticns of tlie population
-17-
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on welfare in the two jurisdicitons.
The four relatacnships discussed are shown in equations ( 3 a-b )
ard anplified in (4) , (5) and (6)
,
(3a) P2 =
^2f^=$2£ I
^2^2 ^2
(3b) P^ = $^SN^ + tg E(G^, U^, U^) + Cgd-t,^)
^1^1 Vl^l
= $^S + tj, E(G^, N^, 1^2^ * ^(^"V
^1 ^l^l^l
Cg - 0, C^ - 0, E(G3^, N^, N2) - 0,
i£.>o, — <0, — >0
9n 8n, 3G,
(4) ^. = * f^wi . ^wV = 1. 2 U. > 0, $: > J ^(>1) > ^
^
I "n~ Ny 111
I
^ (<-^j < j^
(5) N T = N (Y-, a ) ^\l < 0, H/l >!l y, ,wl w '1' Yj^
9y-L
9a>j
(6) N T + N - = Nwl w2
.
w
v*iere P^ is the unadjusted price of public goods per unit output
per dollar of tax base (incase) in the suburb j
S is the constant per capita resource cost of a unit of
public good provision*
Yyr y-i is mean per capita inccme in the suburb, central city
respectively^
<!>. is a cost multiplier reflecting differential proTX)rticnal
velfare client population in jurisdiction i •
a is the standard deviation of tlie inoore distribution in the
^1
central city.
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tp, is that propcHTtion of interjurisdictiaial externality
cost to the city v;hich is not recaptured by taxaticn of
suburbanites
E{G, /N.^N^) is the externality cost function (it includes G, as argumsnt
because N, and N„ establish essentially a percentage cost
increase v^ile G, converts this into an absolute number by
providing the right scale
i
CL,(l-tp,) is the administrative, etc. cost function for city taxation
of suburbanites
N is the total welfare client population in tlie SMSA
N , , N _ are the welfare client populatiions in jurisdictions 1, 2
P^ is the unadjusted per unit, per ciollar price of public
t goods in the central city
o is the standard deviation of the inccme distribution in the central ci-Jiy,
^1
Equation (3a) indicates that P„ depends only on the ccrarrai per
unit per capita resource cost, the veMare load rnultigrlier, ani these
converted to a per dollar price basis by means of average per capita
incone in the suburb. P, differs from this in having larger welfare load,
lower per capita incoras, and in being increased by the net average cost
of interjurisdictional externalities. All of these tend to make P, > P^.
Ihe second term of P, is the per unit per dollar sum of the uncorrpensated
externality cost and the administration costs of taxes en suburbanites.
Equation (4) shews the welfare cost multiplier for each jurisdiction
as a function of the excess welfare client load in that jurisdiction.
Determination of this ^Ifare client load is shown in equation (5) , as
amplified by equation (6) , which assumes a constant nuiiber of velfare
clients in the fixed total SMSA population. (5) shews the welfare
load in the city as a function of the mean and standard deviation of
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the incxsne distribution in the city. A higher mean is associated
with a lo^^r load, a wider dispersion with a higher load.
Vfe now turn to the residential location decision. A household
12
will wave frcm the city to the si±)urb if it can realize TX)sitive
net benefits frcm so doing. All hoasehoMs ejqDecting positive net gains
13
are assumed to move. Since the gains are a descending function of
household inccme level and, as vie shall indicate belcw, for each set
of policy parameters becone negative bela,-/ soma inccns level, an
equilibi±um distribution of the pooulaticn between city and suburb
can be established. All households with positive prospective gains
will suburbanize, all with negative gains will locate in the city, and
the marginal household will be indifferent between the tw5: vdll
have zero prospective gains. Given the monotonicity of net gains with
income level, all we need do is discover that income level at which
net gains are zero. This determines tlie eguilibriim dichotanizaticn
of the population — the equilibrium locaticnal distrifcution, as
expressed in the equilibrium condition below:
VISITS
n . ^ . is the net gain frcm nriving from city to suburb
experienced by the resident in the suburb with
smallest net gains v^en suburban population is
N^: i.e., th.e net gain of marginal suburban
resident j (N„) for population size N .
As discussed above, there are two main types of prospective gain
for suburban residence: land density gains and jiirisdictional benefits.
Thus:
(8) n.,^, . = Jp ,^, , + itT^, .
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where ir
^^ ^
are the land density benefits accruing to niarginal
suburbanite j (N_) fco: suburban population size N-
3(^2)
in ^ . are the jurisdicticnal benefits for j (N.)
.
Land density benefits result from living in an area v^ere land
density is less than in the city: the ccnsunpticn of "privacy" (D)
.
Ihese benefits are offset by the fact that suburban location is,
on balance, less accessible to desired trip destinations than city location.
Travel costs (including the cost of time lost and inconvenience) most
be paid. In addition, the suburloan jurisdiction inposes mininium lot
size zoning to preserve sote differential "privacy" relative to the city.
For households v*io would have chosen, if unconstrained by zoning,
to consume a snaller than the required mininum lot size this represents
an additional utility loss — because the feunily's limited budget is
constrained to an allocaticn less satisfactcry than v*iat it would
have chosen, given only its own tastes and relative market prices.
Ihe net; gain is therefore the resultant of tliese three considerations.
Ihis is expressed in equation (9)
:
(^^
"j(N2)
-^JCN^)^^^"
UJCN^) |x* (D,Pq,H*) D m^, b2),H*>H M -U^ ^2^ (X^)
(9a)
V=^j(N2)(Vyj(rT2))- (^1-^2) «*
v*iere Q . ^ . is the inverse of the marginal utility of income
of household j (N^)
Q(h) is the present value capitalization factor, with h
the interest rate
U^ ^^''2^ is tlie utility function of j (N2)
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* *
X- (D,P ,H ) is the constrained naxinum consuitption package
that wculd be chosen by household j (N») with
suburban location viien the housing lot selected,
*
H , must be at l^st equal to the legal miniraum
established by zcaiing, H'^;
D(Np, bg) is the amoiont of "privacy" consuned in the suburb —
a function of the size of the resident population, N_,
and the percentage of S?4SA business activity tliat takes
place in the suburb, b„. (B, + B- = B are the absolute
amounts.) *
P is the cost of inaccessibility '
j(N„)\ 2'^jO^»))is the capitalized value to Iiousehold j (N_) of annual
14travel costs from suburb boundary to city trip
destinations, and is a function of b_ in that the number
of such destinations depends on the geographic distribution
of business activity (as a major determinant of desirable
destinations) , as well as on y .
^j . , since this influences
the value of the time cost of travel •
r, , r^ are the capital values of a imit of land in city and
suburb,respectively •
X, is the optimal consumption package that would be chosen
by household j (N^) in a city location, and ccnsistent
with the same taste, price and income constraints as
*
apply to X2
,
In the "second best" suburban consuitptian package X^, D and P
are environmental variables determined outside the household. Given the
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household's tastes and income, and the relative prices of all
, * *> ZdOther cantiodities (plus D and P ) , the household selects some H ,H - H ^,
This dependence is shown in (10)
:
(10) H*^^, =H* f "'^' '^j (N,) ' °' ^D' ff'
vdiere y-frq ) ^^ household j (N_) incone level
(P) is the vector of prices of all other conmodities
Ihe other source of locational advantage is jurisdictional gains.
This takes the form of differential tax rates and ccnseqient differential
levels of public services between jurisdictions. It results in a
consumer surplus advantage to the household moving from high tax rate-low
service level jurisdiction to lew tax rate-high service level jtnrisdicticn.
This is measured conventionally as 1/2 the cross product of differential
public good price and differential public good level. The relevant
price differential is that v^rLch faces the marginal mover j (N^) . As
such it contains two elements: the differential jurisdictional tax
rate — which is external to household j (N_) — and the translation of
this into the absolute cost confronting the household via its ovn
income level. The relevant public good level is viiolly eternal
to the marginal mover: it is determined by the distributicn of population
between city and suburb and the resulting median preference majority
vote decisions.
Ihis is shown in equation (11)
:
(1^>
^(N^) = JQ^^ ^j(N2) ^^1 - ^) [°{^2(V' ^2(^2)}
where Q(h) is once again the present value capitalization factor.
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Equatic3n (11) enploys "location-relevant" tax rates both directly
and as a detenninant of public good provision (in t . ) . 15ie concept
of location relevant tax rates stems from the different locational
disincentive of a tax ai land and a tax on mobile assets (iirprovonents)
.
The former will not affect land use decisions; the latter will affect
location and type of use. I'fe assume that each jurisdiction has a
choice of two types of taxes with vi^ich to finance its e5<penditures:
a tax on land alone, and a tax on inproveinents. (Given the association
of housing capital — real estate imnrovements — with household
income, this tax has the effect of an incone tax.) To the extent
that the jurisdic<bion resorts to land taxes to finance its expenditures
it will lessen the locational disadvantage of its total tax burden.
Thus, ve can relate the unadjusted total tax rate burden to its
adjusted locationally-relevant ccmponent as follows:
(12) P^ E P^ /1 - ^i^\ \ i = 1, 2
\ P.N.y.G.
T.R.
—-i^ 1 1
P.N.y.G.
1 i-'i 1
vAiere T. is the land tax rate (per dollar of assessed valuation:
i.e., a proportion of the value of the land)
R. is the total value of land in jurisdiction i.
In order to close the system of determinants of residential
location, we mast indicate the determination of the jurii^dictional
distribution of business activity and the cost of inaccessibility, since
these enter into the expression for Jr.
^
. . The distribution of business
activity is determined largely exogenously. I'fe assume that in the relevant
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range business desires for suburban location are limited by acreage
ceilings established by the suburb's business zoning. More business
would like to locate in the suburbs than are allowed. So the zoning
constraint is effective for both up and down changes. Consequently,
the % of SMSA business v^ich is located in the submrb is solely a
function of the suburb's zoning ceiling. Ihus,
(13) h^ = b(Zj^) - b2 - 1
P^ consists of the elanents V. ,^- . (b„, y. ^, .) , r, and r^, VD
-^^^ 2' ^^(^2'
expresses the household's out-of-pocket, time and convenience costs
for SMSA travel. Ihe pattern of trips is heavily influenced by b
,
and this cost is not literally ictentical for all suburban residents but
is an average of travel costs from the suburban boundary to city
destinations. Ihe additional costs involved by residing beyond the
border will be handled as an adjunct to suburban land value determination.
V has an irtportant subjective ccmpcaient in that, \^ile i-^ may assume
tastes about travel convenience to be equal for all, the value of
time is related systematically to household incore level. Ihus, for
given b_ and each N^ — \iMch determines the identity of household
j (N-) — we can stipulate V . - . .
The value of city and suburban land is much more cortplicated.
As with traditicnal land rent theory, we begin by assuming that rental
levels (and market values as a capitalization of these) are demand-
determined. Bid prices on different pieces of land depend on their
differential advantages for various uses. Since vts are not primarily
concerned with interfuse corpetiticn for land, we assume for convenienoe
that all land is equally good for residential use ^scept as to accessibility.
Moreover,we treat accessibility simply as a function of nearness to the
16
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city center (CBD) . l\te wish to be able to cite a single nuirber
to represent land prices in city and suburb. For this purpose there
is an impcortant asyimetry between city and suburb.
As a preliminary, the existence of pure land taxes (T, ard T_)
creates a backward-shifted tax-capitalization wedge between no-tax
values and cum-tax values of land. "The wedge is as follows:
(14) r^ = (1 - T^) g^ i = 1, 2
vtere r
.
is the per acre market value of land in jurisdicticn i
in the presence of land tax T.
g. is the corresponding land value in the absence of tax T..
The asymmetry concerns determination of the no-tax values g, and g_.
When the sujjply of land is fixed and is homogeneous, demand-
determined price formatiai suggests that land use density is a good
deterroinant of land prices, since it indicates the strength of
ccr^jetition to use the land. This corresponds to the situation
of the city, with frozen boundaries and a given area, except the
different locations within the city have different accessibilities. Vie
can therefore express "the" price of land in the city as the average
price over all these accessibilities for given o\«rall density in
the city."""^
Ettr the suburb, on the other hand, the boundaries are not fixed:
the margin of urban land use there is a function of the size of the urban
population, N_. "Hie model rtust reflect the phenomenon that as N^ rises
the extent of urban land use rises, and therefore that the distcince
of the marginal suburban use to the CBD increases. The expansibility
of this boundary means that the supply of land is not fixed in the
suburb. The ability of a potential new laiid user to settle on newly
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urbanized land is a restricticai against the ability of owners of
already-settled land to raise their prices as a response to an
increase in the sijburban population. Thus, land rentals will not
generally rise to wipe out all consumer surplus accruing to land users:
users will not have to pay as much as they would have been willing
to under the rtost stringent cciipetiticn.
The only ground that established owners will have to raise rentals
(market prices) as N- rises is that newly urbanized land will be
farther out from the ci-b.' center than already-urbanized land and
therefore less valuable for urban use. Sioburbanites will generally
settle as close to the CBD as possible v^ile availing themselves of the
jurisdictional and density benefits of suburban location, other
things being equal. For sinplicity we assume that suburban density
is aj^aroxiraately equal throughout (as guaranteed by uniform zoning)
.
So the first suburbanites live just across the border, and subsequent
population growth set±les adjacent concentric rings. Each wave can
bid outlying land away from niral use at a modicum above the rural
reservation pries. But in so doing it will incur differential
inaccessibility relative to all suburban land closer-in. New suburbanites
would be willing to compete for closer-in land ard pay a price up to
the rural reservation price overbid plus t±ie cost of the relative
inaccessibility. Thus, prices of closer-in land increase as N- increases,
but only by the amount of the relative inaccessibility between the
existing lot and tiie new outmost suburban itargin. A price gradient
develops in the suburb just as in the city and since, for each N^ a
given outmost margin is determined, the set of rural price overbid
plus relative inaccessibility costs is determined for all suburban
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land. Ihis in tuom detentiines the suburban land price facing the
nargiral suburbanite, j (N^) . It is the real price of settling at tlie
outer nargin, v^ether or not j (N^) actually settles there; since the
real rental for every location will be the sane: it will be equal to
the rural price overbid paid to the land owner plus acti:ial travel cost
frail the outer edge to the center, or the saire overbid plus a
coirbination of actual travel cost fran the actaaal locaticn to the
center plus the cost of travel from outer edge to the actual
18
location capitalized in the rent paid to the landlord.
The equilibrating process in the si±aarban land itarket can be
seen in Hie following relations:
(15) a. 92 = g2 = Ls2f2' ^2' ^'^' ^j (Nj)
D
'23g^ >
c. Lg^CN^) =1^ (N^, n.^^^j) 9g^^
^
v^ere
9N2
g
g^ is the suburban land supply price
L__ is the suburban land supply price f'jncticn
g- is the suburban land demand price
I^„ is the suburfcan land demand price fimction
g- is the hil^iest land price that the marginal migrant, j (N_) , vrould
be willing to pay without making his net gains frcm migraticn negative:
in effect, it is the price of land v^ich vrould reduce his net gains
19
to zero. Equation (15c) is therefore an alternative way to specify the
condition for equilibrium population distribution. It is shorn in figure 1.
A A
N_ is the equilibrium population distribution since at N_ the
A A
marginal migrant has n- /^ \ "0/ so N_ tends to persifet; at N_, < N-,
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n. ^ . > 0, so more inigration is encx>araged; at N-» > N„, II. . x < 0»
3 ' oi
'
'^ J '22
so inigration is excessive.
Equilibrium in the subiirban land market really means equilibrium
in suburban and city land markets, since the two are cortpeting for
the same total metropolitan population. The L^„ functiai can help
demonstrate suburban market equilibration becaiose it subsumes a relation
for the city HBrket which v;e have discussed but not yet proposed formally-
namely, the rent demand function in the city. Because of the fixity
of the city land the demand price function serves to deteimine rent
levels there. So, fron our above discussion:
(16) gi = g? = 1^31^1'
V
with fixed SMSA population, N, ve can treat g, and g_ as continuous
variables in a way which directly reveals their interrelationship:
(15'a) 92 = 92^^1' ^=2^ • 8g,
-£ <
.
(16') g^^ = g^(nj^, h^) . 3n^
-i >
.
3n,
Thus, an increase in N both raises g_ and loi<;ers g, and therefore,
all other things equal (namely, constant T, and T_) , has similar
effect on r^ and r^ , An increase in N- decreases r, - r_ and so
increases P = V - (r, - r»)
.
Vfe can now explain v^y, in (15) it is (15a) alone that is
associated with g_. (15b) includes the information from (16)
aicng with the determinants of H. ^ . ; and (15c) is sinply an
alternative for (7), Ihus, they are sSedundant if these other
relationships are expressed separately. Only (15a) gives new infoirmation
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about the land market. For any N^ it is_ I^- that will give g_;
L^„ and equation (15c) sinply irdicate vAiich values of N_ will tend
to persist,
Vie gtust now connect land prices, r. and r^, with the total value
of land in each jurisdiction, R, and R^. This is dene by assuming
a fixed area for both jurisdictions, M, and M^, respectisely, Ihen,
(17) \ = r^\
vAiere M, is the city land area (number of acres)
.
For the subxjrb there is a conplication because the urban land use
development, for vM.ch we have derived r^, may well fall short of M-,
Iherefore,
(18) ^=^2^^^^F^-V
vdiere
M» is the s\±iurban land area (number of acres)
^u is the suburban land area in urban uses
r„ is the price of ncn-'urban land.
As indicated earlier, each jurisdictional government atterpts
to msiximize the productivity of the jurisdicticn as a site for econamic
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activity (including residential and business ) : i.e., to maximize the
total value of land in the jurisdiction. For the city, with fixed urban
area, this simply means to maximize r, , For the suburb it means
to maximize r- because : (1) urban use cannot be spatially extended
without bidding land away fron a non-urban use, so urban extension
involves raising the average price of fixed area M_; (2) urban extension
results in an increase of r„, Ihus, every increase in r^ is associated
with an increase in the average price of land in the suburb as a vdKble,
and max r_ rnplies max average price, and thus total value.
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Toward acc»nplishing their respective goals, the gcfvemnents
posess the following policy instrunents:
central city: (l"tp) — the % of s\±>urban presence externality
costs vdiich are taxed away from sijburbanites;
T, — the proportional city tax on land alone,
suburb; T^ — the proportional suburban tax on land alcne.
Zp — residential zoning regulation specifying
the ndnimum lot size permissible for suburban
residence,
Zp. — business zoning regulation stipulating the
maxiiTuin acreage to be devoted to business
22
activity.
This cotpletes the specification of the model, life now consider the
equilibrating process of the systan,
III . Equilibrating Process in Cna Jurisdiction
A, The Nature of Equilibrium Distribution
To show the equilibrating mechanism it will be convenient to
make use of our assunption of constant overall Si4SA. population, N,
Then we can use n, as the single functional argurtent v^er^fer an
absolute jurisdictional population is indicated.
IJie basic equilibrium ccnditicn is that IT, , . = 0, or that
n.,
.
= -rr , . , The dominant characteristic of the svstern is that
j (n, ) j (n.
)
both types of subxirban gain are a monotcnic increasing function of
household income. Jurisdictional gains for movers are by nature
ncn-negative, but the land density ccrtponent can lead to negative gains,
since the positive source, the size of D, can be very lo;, and the
negative source, V - (r^ ~
^o) ^^^'^ ^ large enough to exceed D in
utility significance.
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Since richer households have more to gain than poorer households
frcMTi suburbanization, we assume they are first to develop the suburb to
urban use. With shbII initial n_ (large n, ) both y , and y. . . are
very hi<^. Also N_ is very low. Similarly D is very high. So in , .
D
and n . . . are very high, as is IT . , . . Vfe assume the probability
of a move in any period (or the speed of an adjusting move) by each
household k is a positive function 6f the size of H, . So tlie next
suburbanites are those just below the previous marginal itrjver in inoone
level. Thus, as n, falls, y- and y. , . fall also, and we can predict
1
the identities of these movers. The SMSA population migrates to the
suburb in the exact sequence of the descending income level array.
The increase of n_ therefore traces out a systematic pattern
for the coirponents of IT . , . , Welfare load benefits and the differential
between public goods provisicn in the t^ro jurisdicitcns decline
substantially beyond soma point. The effect of interjurisdictional
externalities is mixed because, v^ile a lar^r suburban population
irrposes a larger total (and total unccnpensated) externality cost
(per unit of public output) en city taxpayers, and thus a larger
differential price facing city and sx±furban taxpayer, tlie absolute value
of this growing differential to the marginal mo^/er declines because
of the smaller income of successive marginal irovers. On balance,
the fxmction n.. > (n, ) will generally begin high at n, =1 and gently
decline as n, -» 0, remaining positive throughout.
The ITT , . (n.) function is more striking. At values near n, = 1
D is very high, as is y^ and y . , v , So the utility significance of
the privacy gain is very hii^, the cost of inaccessibility rather lew
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(r^-r^ is high), and the minirnum lot constraint inoperative. Jr. , .
begins exceptionally high. But with sitaller n, , D itself declines
as well as the utility significance of each unit of D, r, - r_
falls and the utili^ significance of the out-of-pocket costs of
t±avel rises to offset the lower valuation of travel time, I'Jhen N
is large enough j (n, ) has an incoms level Ict-/ enougii for tlie minimain
lot requireitent to begin binding (especially since r- rises with N- and
so inakes snaller lots more attractive). Further increases in N»,
with declining y . - . , irake the minimum lot ijequirement more and more
onerous. This is doi±)ly abetted by rising r„, since this not only
increases the losses fron minirrum lot zoning, it lessens r, - r^ and
therefore increases the net inaccessibility cost. At seme n,
,
ITT, . will beooms zero. It ccntinues dom.i'/ard to beccane negative
with smaller n,. As n, -» 0, Ir; , . becorres considerably negative.
Equilibrium n, , n, , occurs vhen n., . = -uT - . . This is shown
^ 1' 1' D(n^) 3(^2^)
in figure 2.
In figure 2, the shapes of IT . , , and If. , . reflect sore of the^ '
3 (n-j^) 3 (n-j^)
above discussion. We have drawn ir^,jXi to juxtapose with IT. , . ,
D
Since the equilibriun condition is -IT. , . = IT. , . equilibrium n,,
(i,e.,n) is determined where the Jr. , . function intersects the
3 (t^i)
-ITT, . function. At n, , since If; , \ is positive, rr, > must be
D (n,
)
1' jin^) ^ '2 (n.,
)
negative. "lb the right of this, at hi<^er n, , IT. , . > -H, , .so
n.. » > 0, and mare migration occurs (n, becones smaller). To the
left of n,, ITT, , < -ITT, . , so H . , . < 0, and less migraticn occurs
(n, must be larger) . Only at n, itself does ^^ /„ \ = "^T , s, so the
mairginal mcver is just indifferent—the dichotondzation of the populaticn
is stable.
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Soiie properties of the equilibrium spatial distribution can be noted.
If. , . > , so the suburban price of ptiblic goods is less than that in
the city. Similarly, the quality level of public good provisicn is
greater in the suburb tlian in the city. Behind these lie a higher
nean income in the sulaurb than in the city, a smaller proportional
v^lfare load, and the inposition of net external diseccnomies by
si±»urbanites into city taj^jayers,
IT. . w on the other hand, is negative. The marginal mover finds
that the costs of suburban living exceed the attractions of ICMer density
living, partly becaxose the subiirban population is large enough so that
overall suburban density is considerably less different from that of
the city than under a iruch smaller suburb; partly because the rise
of the suburban population hag caused city rentals to fall and suburban
rentals to rise, so that the relative inaccessibility of the suburb is
not as strongly offset by a big land price differential favoring the
suburb as under a smaller suburb; and partly because the suburban
populaticn includes households of modest enough means so that the
minimum lot requirement finds them having to consume enou^ extra
land than they would have liked as to i.tpose a serious cost.
As fcu: as the land market is concerned, the extensioor.
urban development frontier has proceeded to the point \*iere the cost
of the additional intra-suburban inaccessibility from frontier to the
inner boundary of the sviburb inposes costs on the marginal mover just
great enough so that the additicn to it of the non-urban land use
reservation price (plus a ncminal e) just reduces the migration gains
of the marginal mover to 2Ero. Intramarginal land prices in the
suburb have differentially risen to equalize the terms on vMch land
I-34-
of different accessibilities can coitpete on the H»rket,
So the equilibrium has iirplications for denrographic differences,
differences in the provision of public goods, and differences in
land prices. More generally, populaticn and land use and the econoinics
of the public sector are all at issue,
B, Effects of the Policy Instrunents
The equiliJarium n, described referred to one particular set of values
of the policy instruments. Since changes in these values can affect both
the size and structure of land density and jurisdictional benefits,
they xvill in general affect the equilibrium value of n,
.
Vfe shall give a brief suatmary of the kinds of inpact the policy
variables are likely to have,
1, Z„: An increase in Z_ (i,e,, a la/^r miniitium lot requirannent and
thus a hi^er population ceiling permitted in the suburb) benefits poorer,
not richer households since; (a) the original Z^ vTas only a binding
constraint on poorer houseliolds, (b) the change permits larger n_
and thereby less net privacy benefits and Iwver per capita jurisdictional
benefits. Passing from the top of the income distribution dawnviaxd,
the highest groups were not directly affected by tie peevious Z^, so
its loosening does not now benefit them. At scare point on the array
the first household that was affected will be encountered. The effect
on this household will have been small, since it depends on the difference
between unconstrained and constrained lot size choice: for such a household
unconstained size will have been almost as great as the constrained
minimim. For households with lower and lower incones the discrepancy
will be greater and greater, since unconstrained lot choice is a positive
-35-
functicn of inccane. Ihis incxeasing effect continues downward throu^out
the rarainder of the array.
Ihe key to the effect on equilibrium depends on yiere the effect is
"fisst" felt along the array relative to the initial equilihrium. Since
the IT , . function is always non-negative, equilibrium mast always be
at a value of n, vrfiere net density benefits are negative (to be balanced
by positive jurisdictional benefits) , If in , . reflected only ndniitum
D in,
;
lot size, \fe could infer that H. , . ^/^re negative only vAiere zoning
created losses, so that tlie richest affected household would be
marginal iro/er at the IT
.
, ,
= value of n, , But 11 . , . reflects as
3 (n^^) 1 3 (n^)
well value of privacy less the price of privacy, and this term too can
be negative . Moreover, it is not certain v^iether the household for
vM.ch this term first becoitES negative has higher or lower incoms
tlian the first negative lot size household. The problem is cortplicated
by an interaction effect: a given r, - r_ difference has different
velfare offset to transport costs (V) depending on how large is the lot
for v*iich r- is paid (i.e., H*).
If the privacy ccxiponent breeds negative benefits first, the lot
constraint binds only to the left of v^ere -HT , . =0; if the reverse,
then it bireis to the right of -11 . , % = 0, Ihis is shown in Figure 3.
3 vn, J
Each -n . , . function (-IT) begins at point A for n, = 1 and contains
tbe segment fron A to the point of first impact. At this point there
is a discontinuity follo^'jed by the new segment labeled -IT or -IT or -IT
Where lot size binds first we have -IT , at the same time -IT , and
D'
secord we have -IT . Ihe earlier it binds the greater the utpact of
a change in Z„ (up or down) , and the greater the impact on the equilibrium;
n,"' instead of n," or n, ' . Finally, if the constraint is effective cnly
I
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D
at n, , then the new Icwer segment of -II begins at n, aixJ the equilibrium
remains unchanged.
2, Zg! Changes in Z affect the privacy corrponent of in - . . An increase
in Z decrease the inaccessibility of suburban location. Ihis increases
in, . for all. On the presumption that the richer are more willing to
ccrtmute than the poorer, benefits rise inversely with income. On the
other hand the increase in business activity in the suburb for every level
of n, decrease the amount — and thus the value — of suburban privacy
throughcut. As a luxury good, this adverse effect touches the rich
much more than the poor. On balance of the two effects the richest
probably lose the poorest gain. Ihe dividing line is inportant to the
effect on eqxiLlibriuri, but is not obsious.
The situation is sha<-m in Figure 4. A rise in Z_ causes a coxmter
clocktvise rotation around that point on the original
-IF v+iere the marginal
mover is xmaffected by tlie change in Z„. -IT , -H , -IF represent
successively more adverse effects — an-^. adverse effects on more
households. Ihe first ttra increase eqxdlibrium suburb size (prcfcably
the "normal" case) , but the third actually decreases it.
3. tp,: Cartpensatiai fron suburbanites for juri.sdictional externalities
affects jurisdictional benefits If. , . . If the city can raise 1 - tp
so that the proceeds exceed the extra costs incurred by the cit^ residents —
(19) 3[ tp E(G,, N,, N_) ]2 i i 2 > cl (1 - tp,)
9(1 -tg) E -t
i. e,, then it lowers P, - P_ at every n, : i.e., IT falls throughout,
and thus equilibrium n, rises. Indeed, to maximize r, the city should
raise (1 - tu) so long as (19) is fulfilled. But raising 1 - t^, is not
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straightforward. It involves discovering or creating fonns of taxes
that approximate userdiarges for the variety of incursions suburbanites
make in the consutption of city p\±)lic goods. Ihis is difficult.
Some incursions are too diffuse, sate otherwise tax forms are illegal
or unadministrable, and some have incidence on city dwellers as well
as suburbanites, thereby leaving city resident burrtens not much
23inpcoved. I5iese difficulties are meant to be reflected in the C(l-t^)
function. It is not difficult to imagine that 1 - t^, may not approach
the value of unity at all closely before the extra proceeds from a new
incranent of (l-t^) are more than offset by ^e additional "administrative"
costs engendered by the tax increment.
4, T. : Increase in the land tax rate affect jurisdictional benefits
by decreasing PV - p for each n, , thereby lowering the IT function
throughtut. This lias the effect of increasing n,
.
Ihere is also an inroact on the IF function, and in the same direction.
Through equation (14) , the increase in T. , all other things equal, tends
to decrease r^ via backward-shifting capitalization. This decreases
r, - r^ and so increases P^, which means a decrease in each in , . . This
1 2 D' 3 (n,
;
too tends to increase n, . Of the two effects , that through the IT
function is more direct and probably more powerful. (Vie shall see below,
however, that the city government's target, r, , is not a monotonic increasing
function of T-). The situation is shown in Figure 5. Again, the
original functions are unprimed and tlie impacted functions are primed.
5
.
T_ : The analysis here is symrretric with that of T^ . One effect
of an increase in T_ is on P, - pL as a function of n, . A rising T_
increases Pv - PV for each n, , and therefore raises the IT function.
In consequence, equilibri\jm n, falls. The other effect is on r, - r^:
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by decreasing r^ it increases r^ ~ ^2' ^^^^^^Y decreasing P and
so increasing IK, . for each n,. This too tends to decrease n,
,
The situation can be seen in Figiare 5 by reversing the primes,
Thus, T, and T- are exactly conpetitive policy tools for their
respective goveminents , although, as we shall see below, v^ile they
do have oppposite, they do not have equal effects on n
.
IV. General Equilibrium
In this section vre are concerned with the interaction of the two
jurisdictions in seeking to maximize respective land values. IJie scope
of the paper will not permit a consideration of general equilibriim
with the full panoply of all policy instruments. Vfe shall therefore
concentrate on the respectJ.ve use by the ts-ro jurisdictions of T^ and T
,
v*iere the competiticn of the -t^n is most obvious. Ihe use of t^ by
the city government is only very slightly — if at all — interactive.
Ihe government will push 1 - t^.. as far as its marginal proceeds
exceed marginal "collectioi costs" — and this is essentially independent
of the suburb's use of its policy instrur!entj=! . So we may assume that
in the course of seeking to maximize its land values tirie city sets
1 - t_ at its unique optiFium valtie, indejtendently of its use of T^ or
of tlie suburb's use of T^, 2L and Z, .
Our concentration en T, and T_ therefore amounts to giving inadeqaate
attention to the interactive effects of T^ and T on Z and Z , and vice
versa. Despite this, tlie analysis of T^ and T_ shoiHd give the
flavor of many of the issues involved in general equilibriim. Since
the author's analysis of the model is not cortplete, the present paper
is advanced only as a step towaird the understanding of the model. It
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does not pretend to be a coitplete realizaticn of it.
Vfe begin with the respective inpacts of T, and T„. Given t^, and
initial values of T,, T-, Z_ and Z„, T, will be set so that:
(20) dr^ 3(1 - TJ g, 3g,
^= 1—i=Oor(l-T) ^=g,
Ihus, if at initial T. (1-t, ) ^1 ^ „ -n w • ^1 1 -p^- > g, , T^ will be increased
(1-T ) ^^1
1
-rs!- < g-, , T^ Will be decreased
(1-T ) ^%
1
-^s— = Sx**^! ^ill ^ left unchanged
">&
While 9r, is a cortplicated ejqaressian," ' we can witli soine confidence
"St^
trace out a t^/pical relationship betv^en r^ and T,, For given value of T_,
at low val\ies of T,
^g^ is low and, partly because of (l-T, ) and partly
because of 3g, , (l-T,) dg, .,.. ,„ • .x^ ui--_i- j
_
1 ' 1
_
1 IS high. As T, rises throijgh higher and
W^ "StT
higher values, the first rises in absolute terms and the second declines.
9r
There cores a value of T^ at '-^^ich the t\-K> are equal; so 1 = 0, and r,
"St^
reaches a Ttiaximum. thereafter 9r, beoones negative. Thia-shape is shown
in Figure 6. Ihe value T. is v*iere, for given T_, r. is a maximum.
25
The same analysis applies to T_. It will generally be the case
9r
that 2_ begins high, gradually decreases with increasing T_, becomes
zero ana then negative. The sam shape shown for r, and T, in Figure 6
holds here.
Thus, with given values of the other policy variables, each
jurisdicticn will generally discover an interior optimum value of T,:
neither T, , nor T_ is either zero or unity, VJhat is the effect on this
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optiinLin T. if the other jixrisdiction • should have a different land tax
rate? Given the conplexity of the cross partial derivatives
2 2
3^r^ Tr^
' and there is no unique anser. In general a change
in given T_ will change the qptimal T^ ; similarly a change in given T^
will change the optimal T . But it is not even possible to say v^iether
the change mil be a rise or fall: the signs of the cross partlals
are not unique. Indeed, it is not only possible, but reascnaile, for
the sign of either to be positive for some T^ , T_ pairs and negative
for others.
This wide range of possibilities is unfortunate becaxise the pattern
of signs detennines the stability of the interaction syste. Sij^jpose
ve begin the systan at same hypothetical position: jurisdiction 1
has set tp at its independently qptimal level, and jurisdiction 2
has exogenously set ZL, Z and T„. Assume that after a certain
period necessary to oeroeive, OCTnorehend and arrive at a public policy
decision, jurisdiotiai 1 sets its T, at the optimum for that situation.
Now the samd kind of interval nasses wbdle jurisdiction 2 decides en
its best new value of T_, T — changing its vali:ie from the initial
arbitrary level. The change in T_ changes the optimal T^ and it is
therefore changed; this changes the optimal T- and it is changed. Is
there convergence in this system, so that it will ccare to rest at
soire (T^ , T,,) , ^.^^ere each value is corrpatible with the other, or will
the two jurisdictions ccntinue their interactive oscillations indefinitely?
The ansver depends on the pattern of response that each nsakes to changes
in the other: the reaction fionctions.
-41-
Figure 1 , a-d, shcfw four possible paris of reaction functions,
A
In each T, (T-) is the function showing the optimal value of T^ for every
hypothetical value of T-; T (T, ) is the function showing the optiinal
value of T_ for every value of T, . Figiires a and c are unstable, in that,
v\^tever the starting point, the series of ccnsecutive adjustments of
each to the other draws the oscillaticns farther and farther a\vay from
the intersection of the two functions. Only if the initial position
had accidentally been at the intersection would it stay there. The
slightest discrepeincv'', howevar, and the system would flee the intersection.
No stable irutual equilibriim exists for tiiese situations. Figures b and d
represent stable systems. Wnatever the starting position, the successive
mutual adjustments mil converge tov/ard, and reach,the intersecticn.
The intersecticn here represents a genuine stable joint eqiulibrium.
As indicated above, no unique shaj^e can be predicted for out
t>ro jurisdictions' reaction functions, Hrwever, analysis of the cross
partial derivatives suggests an asyinnetr/ of response beti^een city and
suburb, reflectijig in part the different specialized roles of the two:
high-density, high accessibility for the one, low density, less accessibility
for (the other, with different policy instruments appropriate to carrying
out these roles. It suggests that a reasonable pattern of reaction may
be that shown in Figure 8.
Here T, (T^) is monotonic rising, with positive T, intercept, T_(T, ),
on the other hand , falls for low values of T^ and then rises only for hi^
values of T^ . Ihis pattern of interaction is convergent. So the system
is stable ard the intersecticn of functions defines a true joint equilibrium,
ft ft
(T, , T_) , It IS important to notice that this is an interior equilibrium:
neither T^ nor T_ equals zero or unity. Moreover, this will result in an
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interior equilibriijin populaticn distribution: niether jurisdiction will
attract the v^ole pqpulation. Ihis nodel, with this type of interactive
pattern, will generate comer solutions only by rare accident.
Having begun with an dptimal t^ and some exogenously given
Z-. and Z_, vfs see that under some conditions v^ cfotain stable values
A
«
. ., . , .
^ »
of T. and 5 , and therefore also, of n, and r, and r_ (v^ere, as usual,
the double "hat" denotes the jointly ccrtipatible values) . Will these
latter equilibrium values change if Z^, and Z_ change? Yes, ^nerally,
since as discussed above, both instruinents affect the level and shape
of the IT and IT functicns, aix3 will therefojre elicit new sequences
of interactions. Only fron such interactions can optirral values
of ZL and Z_ be arrived at also. In sum, the true stable maxima for
r, and r_, if they exist at all, are obtained only by the simultaneous
determination of all policy variables at their jointly optiital levels,
with conplex interactive relaticns existing between zoning and taxing
instruments.
,
VI. Ccrnments in Qomparative Statics
A. Balance of Power
1. The Use of T. and T_
T, and T^ are hic^ly syimEtric types of policy instruments for
their respective jurisdictions. But their use involves two asymmetries
between the central city and the suburb. First:
(21) 3 (Pi -4^
3 \
3(Pl -P^)2'
\ '^1
\Y^ \ ^^l
6 P^ - 5G
^ 9G29^2
-1- -4- 5P^-6G
N2Y2 V
9P^
7 1
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for eacii n, cind if one makes the reasonable assumption that 3G, 9G.
then
(21') 9 (P«-
^^'
'^1
9 <-^ p«,
3 T,
I^Yl
h
^2^2
3P,
R
9P.
r '
Ri N-Y.2^2
^ NlYl
and the ratio changes in general for different n, . Although their
iirpact iTBchanisms en the attractiveness of suburban location are
exactly opposite, their opposite effects are not generally equal
or even dependably related in a simple way.
Ihus, the effectiveness of T^ and T^ in changing the relative
attractiveness of suburban location are not equal. But further, the
effect of induced migration upon rentals itay not be equal either. At
the differential land densities beti<;een city and suburb in the relevant
range, city reotais are likely to be more responsive to small population
shifts ( a given nu:±»er of migrant" changes absolute densities more
in the city tlian in the suburb because of the latter' s much larger area)
.
Ihus, equation (22) is lUcely to hold in much of the relevant range.
(22) 9g^
9n,
9g,
9n,
Granted the uncertainty connected with the first assymeLry , ff.
may on the average be a more effective instrument than T- for increasing
rentals in absolute terms.
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2, The Use of Z and 2L
These zoning instruments have an effect generally opposite to that
of T, . Their possession by the suburb but not by the city — not because
they are unavailable but because they would be unavailing, since the
residential and business demand for urban land do not have the specialized
character that they have for suburban land, given the presence of the city
offset the scmewhat greater effectiveness of T, relative to T^.
3. Density
There is, however, a further ccnstraint en the suburban government
in the context of bargaining rivalry with the central city go^/emment.
While the latter seeks the highest density possible in trying to
maximize r, , the prospect of very high densities beyond sore point
mi^t induce reverse migration, thereby actually tending to IcMsr r_.
An iitportant — but of course not sole — source of the intensity
of demand for si±furban land is low density use (privacy) and this is
lost at hi^ values of n_,
B, Broad Infliaanoss en the Outcones
1. The greater the degree of incme inec[uality in the metropolitan
area, the greater will be the size of si±(urban benefits and thus the
higher will be r_ . At the same time the suburban tDopulatd.on may be
larger than otherwise, sinoe IT. , . is a positive function of income
inequality. But the larger size of n^ is only a possibilj-ty, becatise
in some ranges of n_ and under certain overall circumstances, very hi^
income households may outbid new entrants for use of suburban land
(through both outright land market ccanpetiticn and appropriate zoning)
in order to preserve low density.
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2. lilne higher is average household inooire in the metropolitan area
r
the greater are likely to be
_2 and n_ . Since privacy is a luxury
good an increased y v^iich 1 reflects generally increasing living
standards in the population will increase the nuniber of people v^o
can afford to buy privacy and the price they are willing to pay for it.
This will be styitded only if tlie higher y reflects prinerily iirproveraent
at the very top — greater inequality of incoine — for then the outbidding
effect imder # 1 above can occia:.
3. Industrialization of the suburbs throu^ moderately higher b_ may
raise ru and with it
_2_ , again depending on inooine distribution
^1
considerations: i.e. \*iether the value of suburban land for privacy
is greater than for general urban development, or vice versa { as in
the central city) . Ihe ambiguity about n^ and greater
_2_ is nourished
A
^1
by the fact that hi^er b- involves a decrease in the per capita generation
of interjurisdictional ecitemalities I — J, since the subxirb becciTBS
more self-sufficient with re"5nect to erployment, shopning and recreaticn.
R R
Tliis decreases the whole Jl. . . function by lessening the P, - P- and
differentials. As a result, there is a downward impact on r^ and n_.
4. Ihe greater the assortment of local taxes used by the central
A
city the 44wer is apt to be 2 and n_. Ihis stems fron the fact that
A '^
a richer assortment of revenue tools can increase 1 - t_, at low cost,
therefcare decrease t^ and thus P, - P^ and G_ - G, and so lessen the
suburbcinizing inpetios given by the generation of intei>«Jtirisdictional
externalities
.
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VII. Ihe Effect of Jurisdictional Separatism
Finally, we may briefly cartment on vtot effect the existence of
jurisdictional separatism has on the pattern of itietropolitan development.
In our model we have separated the si±iurbanizing forces into two
categories — the land density factors and the jurisdictional factors.
The latter in fact owe their existence entirely to the existence of a
separate suburban political jurisdiction, with no respcnsibilitY to,
or dependence on, the central city's covemment. It is this that allows
unequal spatial distribution of i-telfare clients and inccme generally,
and spatial cross-over uses, to create an inequality of political
opportunity (P. - PV > 0) . 'Ihe very same snatial distribution and
27
set of cross-over uses woflild not generate subixrloanizing pressure
through politica]. inequality/ if the metropolitan area comprised
a single local political jvrrisdiction.
Vfe can examine how ituch difference this would make to our general
equilibriijn outcciTe by considering the ccnsequenoes of merging jurisdicticns
and thus wiping out jurisdictional advantages. We should expect that
there would remain what vie have called land density grounds for suburban
development. Iliis has ti^ro coipcnants: (1) tiie value of privacy (lower
"natural" \ase density, augmented by minimum lot zoning)
, (2) a price
arbitirage, involving the land price differential relative to the cost
of inaccessibility (r, - r^ versus V) ,
'
Ihere is an ambiguity in this formulation. Minimum lot zoning
certainiy is part of the complex of the suburb's privacy advantage. But
it probably cmbs its existence in the real world to the existence of the
separate suburban jurisdiction. One could conceive of a single metropolitan-
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wide government setting zcning restrictions to preserve specialized
locational characteristics, but such restrictions would likely be
far less extensive and constraining than under a separate suburban
jurisdiction (rementoer the catpetitive function of Z^ in naxindzing r_)
,
Accordingly, we shall exairdne two possible variants of the problem:
first, assvmng that the same Z^^ is in effect with or without separate
jurisdictions; second, assuming that minimum lot zoning is aibsent
under separate jurisdicticns. In each of the variants ve ask; what
will happen to our previous <^neral equilibrium outccme if jurisdictional
benefits are eliminated? Variant I (Z_ and zf intact)
The situation is shown in Figiire 9. Suppose the general equilibrating
Drocess established -ITT , . and IT . , , as the equilibrium fonctions,
;] (n, ) J (n, )
^
n J
Then the general equil3±)rium is at n, , with -ITT , . = n . - . . How
jurisdictions are merged, ao all jurisdictional advantages, shewn as
the hei^t of the in , . function, disappear. Ihe new equilibrium occurs
vtere the marginal mover derives zero net benefits fran the density use
conplex alone — shcvm as -11 . . . , So equilibrium population shifts to
n,-, vAiere -n . . . = 6 = in , . , In sunmarizing the consequences of
this merger ve shall at tlie sane time be inidicating (by conceiving
the reverse operation) vAiat difference the existence of jurisdictional
separateness makes in the model, Ihe effects of merging are:
(a) A change in equilil^rium n_: n, increases from n, to n.- ( i.e.,
suburban population falls by this anrrunti,
(b) A change in 6G: fiP =0, the discrepancy in p\±)lic good output
betaeen city and suburb disappears. Insofar as per capita income still differs
betv;een city and suburb, the suburbanites would still prefer a higher public good
output then city dwellers; but since under a single jurisdiction only a
single jurisdiction only a single, majprity-rule determined outpjt is provided,
no difference in actual output occurs.
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(c) A redistributian of real incxms (welfare) : (1) Fqr the top
n- in the income array the loss of the serrate jurisdiction causes
(23) this welfare loss = ^Yj '^^^^ ^^7}
v^tere 6pJ
s p - p^ , 6G2 = G2 - G, "
P being the price of public goods in the single jurisdiction
inetropolitan area as a v^ole.
G being the output of public goods in the single jurisdiction
inetropolitan area as a v;hole.
when price rises to that level reflected by the single jurisdiction tax rate.
(2) For the bottcm n, in the inccme arrav the loss of the separate jurisdiction caus
(24) this welfare gain - 1
-^ ^^^ ^-^
where 6P^^ h p^ - p, 6G^ E G - G^
\<4ien price falls to that level reflected bv the single jurisdiction tax rate.
So merger leads to a progressive redistribution (separation leads to
a regressive income redistributiai)
.
(d) A decrease in resource allocation inefficiency: inter-jurisdictional
externalities led to an excess per output unit cost of tpE/G-, vMch
represents a deadtieight loss in the efficiency of resource allocation
(because it pronoted inappropriate incentives for using resources)
.
Merger succeeds in internalizing the externalities arising from spatial
cross-over uses and thereby eliminates the resource inefficiency.
(e) Effect en land prices: r- \d.ll fall, since it is now
influenced by density benefits and inaccessibility costs cnly, with
no additional demand filli:^ given through jurisdicticnal benefits.
Variant II (Z_ and Z„ absent)
The situation is sliown in Figiire 9 also. Here, however, instead of
the -IT remaining unchanged, political merger will end privacy-protecting
-49-
residcffitial and business zoning, so that the gains from differential
density are no longer so markefl (e.g., for the same n- there nay be
much larger b_ than in the presence of Z„. This will tend to decrease
the size of positive benefits arising from density considerations since
only privacy benefits which can persist xd.thout zcning protection will
remain. On the other hand, the absence of irdnimum lot zcning means
that poorer households can establish themselves on smaller lots (with
resulting higher density land ase for any n») without penalty. No
one need sustain any loss on density account for there is no longer a
minimum lot loss, and since privacy is the only reiraining source of
relative attractiveness, relative rentals must adjust da^7nv^'ard to offset
any remaining inaccessibility, so that tlie price of privacy cannot
exceed the value of privacy. Therefore negative Jr. . . disappears
and equilibrium exists where IT = on a wholly non-negative H function.
Figure 9 shows the counterclockwise rotational shift in the -11 function.
As in Variant 1, Jr. . ^ = tliroughout, so the equilibrium shifts to
nl^. This is likely to iixply a smaller suburban pq^ulaticn than under
separate jurisdictions with zcning, but larger than vmder Variant I with
zoning. Densit^' in the suburb \i7ill prohablv be hi(^er for each given
suburban population size, because there is likely to be m^re business
activity, and because the pattern of residential use is likely to
involve smaller lots. Partly because of constraints against perfect
mctoility of business activity, sane inacc32ssibility will persist at
n„ = •= , whereas privacy will essentially have disappeared, so
1
equilibrium n, is likely to exceed y. The income redistributive effect is the same
here as under Variant I. Some income stratification between city and suburb, but
less than under Variant I, will persist, although the siisurb will becone much irore
similar to tlie citv with respect to densitv.
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"Die difference be-to\/een Variants I and II is even greater than this
in a less restricted model. In tMs model, by assiming away the influence
of tastes and danograyiiic characteristics on location decisicns we have
made incane level the only source of difference in these decisions.
We have made zoning sx:iperfluous in determining the relative attractiveness
of suburban over city location for different households: the richer
will always prefer the suburbs more than the poor. Zoning in tiiis
model only sets an absolute scale for these relative attractions —
thus helping to provide a cut-off point but not affecting the carder
of households in the preference quexas. In a more general model vhere
tastes can differ for reasons other than income level the existence
of zoning maJ-'.es income level a more important determinant than it would
otherwise be. So the abolition of zcning would treaken income as
a self-selector of snbxorb-vs.-city location, and incane heterogeneity
vrould be rruch more marked in the suburb. But then relative density
would be affected as vrell, with tlie upshot tliat a specific specialized
low-density role for the suburbs could not be maintained (unlike in
the present model under Variant II , where sane specialization rsinalns)
,
Ihe reallocative results wouM thereby be far greater than in the
present model. In short, zoning has much less bite in the present model
than it would if additicnal demographic determinants of location vrerd
adrdtted ( a perfectly reascnable extension) , So the difference between
Variants I and II is potentially ccnsiderably greater than is seen here.
In sum, within this model, the possibility of establishing a
separate sul^urban political jurisdicticn enlarges the suburbs, increases
-Sl-
its land values, creates a divergence in the quality of public output
between city and suburb, brings welfare gains to the wealthy at the
ejq^ense of the poor, and permits resource use inefficiencies to develop
as a result of spatial cross-over uses.
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Notes
1. A related, but quite different, incdel is given in the author's
"Strategic Interaction and Resource Allocation in Metropolitan Interaovem-
iiental Relations/' Anerican Economic Review
,
Vol. LIX, No. 2 May, i969)
,
495-503.
2. Migration is not difficult to append, but the issues presented
here are not affected by its absence.
3. Here too, realistic variation can be introduced without disturbing
the essence of the arguiiEnt. "nierr e>E:liasion allows a point of departure
vrfiich enables one to separate out a pure governmental impact from demographic
considerations,
4. "Strategic Intaracticn...", op. cit .
5. In the remainder of the paper we shall neglect the idiosyncratic
circuiTBtanoes of thoso for '-^Tom suburban location represents greater, rather
than lesser, accessibility. This exclxjF.icn is serious for some metropolitan
areas v^ere decentralization of business and cxoltural activities is extensive.
In our treatment, the central cit^' is still notably more concentrated in
relevant trip destination?; than the suburb, as noted above.
6. See m/ oaper, "Strategic Interaction .,," for a mora detailed
exposition of this point.
7. Location is voluntar^% In this incdel, we assume no one is
either forced tc locate anyviiere, or legally prevented fron locating anywhere,
8. Since tney are capitalized in land selling prices the present owner,
or a relocating cwner, does not bear the burden unless the tax rate changes
during his tenure. But this model is interpreted as a long run model, so
such changes are assurred adjusted to through capitalizaticn and backward
shifting during land sales,
9. This, of course, results frcm emitting all sources of locational
taste other tiian income level.
10. If differential public output levels are a caiose as well as sinply
an effect of location decisions, this opens up a possibility of instability
in the system as a v^ole; since households will be making location decisions
on the basis of a present set of output differences, and these very decisions
will change the output differences to provoke new rcunds of unsatisfied
adjustment.
11. With "pure" public goods no additional resources would be needed:
the level of "consumpticn" of the pi±>lic goods by each merger of the population
VTOuld depend only on the level of rjublic goods provision (a given total
resource use) and be independent of the number of people v^o were to share
in the ccnsunpticn.
12. Since we hold total S^A populaticn constant for cxanvenience
vre speak of the location decision as an interjurisdictional shift rather
than as a direct locating from outside the SMSA,
13. In a dynamic setting, they move at speeds directly related to
the size of such gaijLS, See next section.
14. Ihe spatial characteristics of the sviburb, and the raticaiale
for this treatment of travel costs, will be made clear belcM in the
discussion of land value deteinnination.
15. Since we shall see that this ceiling is a policy variable
whose cptimal value depends on the other locational variables in the
system, business location is in a deeper sense endogenous.
Ihe author is currently developing other models in v^ich business
location denand is also made endogenous, parallel with residential
location demand.
16. Ife are neglecting neighborhood amenities and topographical
and micro-climatic differences.
17. The presence of given business activity will of course influence
this.
18. A slight source of differences in real prices throu(^out the
suburb is that successive migrants have different valxiaticns of travel
time. Transactions and moving costs also modify the stateirent in the
text. But it affects only slightly the argument that the effective price
the marginal migrant will have to pay is his valuatioi of travel costs
from the margin plus the rural price overbid.
19. To equation 7,
20. I'fe cmLt governmental and other non-profit uses for siitplicity.
21. Ihis has the effect of stipulating the maximum nijr±>er of households
(thus, approxinately the maxi-irum population) v*iich can legally reside in
the suburb. It is possible for the population which desires to move to
the suburb to exceed the maximum, allowable. If so, the maximum allowable
population will be tlie ceiling population,
22. Alternatively, this mi^t be specified In terms of amount of
value acMed permitted,
23. IJ-iere is also the practical problem of such taxes giving rise
to unsatisfactory incentive effects — so-called dead-weight loss effect:s
(decreased efficiency of resource allocation)
,
1
"i7i V'^ yiifT" '''i
with the first term negative and the secor*i term positive,
(6P^ = P^ - P^ , 6G = G^ ~ G^j II°-1 is the inverse function to iP.)
25. ^
with the first term negative and second term positive.
26. Conditions are easily conceivable vMch mi<^t — which in fact may —
hcnvogenize the density use throuc^out the entire metropolitan area. No
specialized suburban function in terms of relative density woiold then remain,
27. Of course, an absence of jvnrisdicticnal advantages vro^old prevent
the sama pattern of spaticil distribution and cross-over use from developing,
as will be seen below.
28. Zg has much the same purpose and effect as Z^ wilii respect to
preserving low density use. Therefore, we bunch the two together in
botii variants.
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